

# 2STiC: Future internet technologies

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# Outline


- Some SCION principles...
- SCION at SIDN Labs...
- Challenges in hardware...

# Some SCION principles

- Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-generation Networks
- New inter-networking architecture
- Routes authenticated both in control and data plane
  - Path control by sender: transparency
  - Multiple paths: stable
- Scalability and security through Isolation Domains (ISDs)
  - Isolation of compromise: security
  - For instance per country or jurisdiction: transparency
- Research at ETH Zürich

# Isolation Domains

- PKI organised per Isolation Domain (ISD)
- core ASes managing the ISD core
  - For instance per country or jurisdiction
- Hierarchical control plane
  - Inter-ISD control plane
  - Intra-ISD control plane




Source: The SCION Internet Architecture: An Internet Architecture for the 21st Century, Barrera et al., 2017

# Path discovery

- Inter-ISD
  - Performed by core ASes
  - Flooding similar as with BGP
  - Less ASes involved (only core ASes)
- Intra-ISD...
  - Downstream multi-path flooding

# Intra-ISD path discovery

- Path Construction Beacons (PCBs) sent downstream using multi-path flooding
  - Initiated by ISD core nodes
  - Extended and forwarded by receiving ASes
  - Add IN and OUT interface and optional peerings
- Eventually all nodes know how ISD core can be reached
- AS registers preferred down-segments (path from ISD core to AS) with Path Server in the ISD core
- Preferred up-segments registered with Local Path Server



# Isolation of compromise

- Path Construction Beacons are signed by every AS along the path:
  - Can be verified within ISD
- Contain Hop-Fields (HF) for use in later select paths
  - Contain Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed using Hop-Field key
  - Only processed locally by AS
- Provides security (DDoS, route hijacking)



# Path control by sender

- Path construction performed by sender
- Request route to (ISD, AS) from Local Path Server
- Local Path Server replies with lists of
  - up-path segments to local ISD core
  - core-path segments to connect up-path and down-path segments
  - down-path segment in remote ISD from ISD core to destination AS
- Sender combines segments to determine path
- Provides transparency

# Routing

Path information included in SCION packet header

- Corresponding Hop-Field included

  - Contain Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed using Hop-Field key

  - Only processed locally

- No forwarding tables necessary at routers

- Packet-carried forwarding state (PCFS)


Sender selects the path

- Possible to use multiple paths

Recipient address no longer used to route between ASs


- Only used by the destination AS

# Routing



Source: SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture, Perrig et al., 2017

# SCION packet header



# SCION at SIDN Labs

# SCION at SIDN Labs

- Connected to international testbed SCIONLab
- Developed SCION application: Snetcat
- Visualisation of SCION paths
- Implementation of SCION in P4
  - Implementation working in P4 simulation (simple\_switch)
  - Implementation for hardware work in progress...
    - Both at ETH Zürich and SIDN Labs


# Challenges in hardware

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
- Implicit lengths of addresses
- Absolute reference
- Implicit number of Info-Fields
- Selection of Info-Fields and Hop-Fields
- Number of Hop-Fields variable




# SCION headers – Implicit length of addresses



# SCION headers – Absolute reference



# SCION headers – Implicit number of Info-Fields







# Questions?

- Do people know about guidelines how to defined protocols with hardware in mind?

*Volg ons*

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**Thanks for your attention!**

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