



DDoS Clearing House for Europe Cross-sector Pilot Demo


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




DDoS Examples



Mirai botnet: Dyn, OVH
(hosting provider), Krebs
On Security (website),
Deutsche Telecom (ISP)




January 2018



DDoS Clearing House Concept

- Continuous and automatic sharing of “DDoS fingerprints” buys providers time (proactive)
- Extends DDoS protection services that critical service providers use and does not replace them
- Generic: for example, per Member State, per sector, per business unit






T3.2 Objectives

- Pilot a DDoS Clearing House with European industry for Europe to proactively and collaboratively protect European critical infrastructure against DDoS attacks
- Key outputs: pilots in NL >> IT, DDoS clearing house cookbook
- Build on existing components



Key challenge: increase to
TRL 5-7 and grow
deployment





Starting Point: Pilot in the Netherlands



CONCORDIA partner



CONCORDIA partner



National Cyber Security Centre
Ministry of Justice and Security



UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.

CONCORDIA partner



The Interconnect Exchange




Belastingdienst



Agentschap Telecom
Ministerie van Economische Zaken
en Klimaat



Stichting
Digitale Infrastructuur
Nederland



NBIP
nationale
beheersorganisatie
internet
providers



Plus NoMoreDDoS and Dutch Continuity Board



Y1 Accomplishments

- Experimental setup (ddosdb.nl) pilot NL
- Draft data sharing agreement for pilot phase 1
- Draft organizational structure
- Draft overall architecture
- System requirements (funded by NBIP, SURF, NCSC-NL)
- Extensive dissemination (e.g., One Conference, Open Door Event)



Y1 Lessons Learned

- **Key lesson learned: much more than a technical challenge**
- Need for a DDoS clearing house widely acknowledged
- Clearing house needs to be anchored in an “anti-DDoS coalition”
- Value of clearing house community goes beyond sharing fingerprints
- An anti-DDoS coalition needs a legal working group
- Start small, then grow (personal trust is crucial in early stages)
- Keep initial data sharing agreement crisp, simple, and scalable
- Early collaboration with legal experts and ops teams is a must
- CONCORDIA partners play a challenging bridging role




Y2 Plans

- NL pilot: blog on lessons learned, sign data sharing agreement, start sharing in non-production environment, improve software
- Set up an instance of the clearing house at specifically for T3.2 (ddosdb.eu), run experiments, translate the data sharing agreement from Dutch to English
- Further reinforce collaboration within Task 3.2 as well as with other related tasks in CONCORDIA (Tasks 1.1., 1.2, 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5)



Demo: Clearing House Prototype





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


Backup Slides



Input: Network Traffic


- Captured traffic (.pcap) includes attack traffic as well as legitimate traffic containing private info about the target network





DDoS Dissector

- *ddos_disector* library filters, anonymizes and summarizes the input traffic and provides a fingerprint (.json) and anonymized attack only trace (.pcap) as outputs





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```
user@host: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
user@host:~$ python3 ddos_dissector/src/ddos_dissector_cli.py --input network_traffic.pcap  
input file: /tmp/tmpgiiid9go  
output file: output/7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816.pcap  
28495 packets (40580268 bytes) written  
  
DDoS dissector completed task! Please check: output/7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816.log  
user@host:~$
```



Output: Attack Trace

- Anonymized and filtered attack only trace (.pcap)

7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
2	0.000039	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
3	0.002066	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
4	0.002517	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
5	0.003383	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
6	0.003857	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
7	0.004892	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
8	0.005144	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
9	0.007648	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu
10	0.009154	216.118.109.24	127.0.0.1	DNS	4030	Standard query response 0xf6fa ANY fkfkfkfz.gu

Frame 1: 4030 bytes on wire (32240 bits), 1500 bytes captured (12000 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: 06:90:f4:0e:e0:ff (06:90:f4:0e:e0:ff), Dst: 06:9a:6c:66:90:33 (06:9a:6c:66:90:33)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 216.118.109.24, Dst: 127.0.0.1
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 53, Dst Port: 61548
Domain Name System (response)
[Packet size limited during capture: DNS truncated]

0000 06 9a 6c 66 90 33 06 90 f4 0e e0 ff 08 00 45 00 ..1f 3...E..
0010 0f b0 6e e0 00 00 6c 11 0b cd d8 76 6d 18 7f 00 ...n...1...vm..
0020 00 01 00 35 f0 6c 0f 9c b3 d4 f6 fa 83 80 00 01 ...5...f fkfkfkfz..
0030 00 f5 00 00 00 01 08 66 6b 66 6b 66 6b 66 7a 04 guru...+..
0040 67 75 72 75 00 00 ff 00 01 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
0050 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c1 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
0060 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c2 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
0070 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c3 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
0080 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c4 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
0090 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c5 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
00a0 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c6 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
00b0 01 29 d3 00 04 cc 2e 2b c7 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00)...+..
Packets: 28495 - Displayed: 28495 (100.0%) Profile: Default



Output: DDoS Fingerprint

- Attack fingerprint (.json)

```
7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816.json
{
  "file_type": "pcap",
  "protocol": "DNS",
  "additional": {
    "dns_query": "fkfkfkfz.guru",
    "dns_type": 255.0
  },
  "src_ips": [
    "216.118.109.24",
    "216.132.54.164",
    "216.132.54.163",
    *
    *
    *
    "212.146.47.27",
    "212.143.218.20",
    "210.87.253.54"
  ],
  "total_src_ips": 84,
  "src_ports": [
    53
  ],
  "total_src_ports": 1,
  "dst_ports": [
    61548,
    3187,
    27376,
    *
    *
    *
    2676,
    8820,
    16818
  ],
  "total_dst_ports": 470,
  "start_time": "2017-12-29 21:22:27",
  "duration_sec": 34.77242922782898,
  "total_packets": 28495,
  "avg_pps": 819.4710761592393,
  "avg_bps": 3149255.7302369727,
  "vector_filter": "(['ws.col.Protocol']=='DNS')&(['srcport']==53)&(['dns.qry.name']=='fkfkfkfz.guru')",
  "multivector_key": "7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816"
}
```




DDoSDB

- Outputs are stored in DDoSDB database for data sharing and proactive mitigation of attacks

```
{
  "cc": "SE",
  "as": "8871",
  "ip": "212.15.86.12",
  "cc": "GB",
  "as": "1257",
  "ip": "212.247.9.100",
  "cc": "SE",
  "as": "3301",
  "ip": "212.181.80.6",
  "cc": "SE",
  ...
  "src_ports": [
    53
  ],
  "dst_ports": [
    61548,
    3187,
    27376,
    21898,
    23292,
    39143,
    43168,
    40751,
    37264,
    20763,
    ...
  ],
  "start_time": "2014-12-25 20:22:27",
  "duration_sec": 34.77242927282898,
  "key": "7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816",
  "multivector_key": "7f1b6c1816803c714cf58af762e57816"
}
```

Fingerprint - Attack traces Compare

Compare source IPs



Future Work

- Developing DDoS fingerprint parsers to convert fingerprints to rules and share these rules with stakeholders
- These rules can be applied to different mitigation boxes in the network with different levels of specificity to mitigate DDoS attacks