Anycast vs. DDoS: Evaluating Nov. 30

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
¹SIDN Labs ² University of Twente ³USC/ISI

NMRG at IETF 97 Seoul 2016-11-15 V 0.1






A Bad Day at the Root...





How Well Does Anycast Defend?



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Contributions

- public evaluation of anycast under stress
- public articulation of design options
- evaluation of collateral damage
- goals:
 - public discussion \rightarrow greater transparency
 - expectation setting
 - possible future defenses










































LABS






LABS















Anycast Reactions to Stress (do nothing?)





Anycast Reactions to Stress (withdraw some routes?)





Anycast Reactions to Stress (withdraw other routes?)

your

triend

X-PRG

other

1. nothing: X-SJC is **degraded absorber**, protecting X-SYD's users

attackers

- 2. withdraw routes from X-SJC; may shift attackers to big site $\bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc$
- **3. withdraw** wrong routes from X-SJC; may shift attackers to other site

LABS

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
you



another

friend

Best Reaction to Stress? You Don't Know






Data About Nov. 30

- RIPE Atlas
 - ~9000 vantage points (RIPE Atlas probes)
 - try every letter every 4 minutes
 - CHAOS query identifies server and implies site
 - targets *letters*, not Root DNS
 - we map server->site
 - map will be public dataset
- RSSAC-002 reports
 - self-reports from letters
 - not guaranteed when under stress
- BGPmon routing
 - control plane

6996 RIPE Atlas VPs on 2015-11-30 (looking at K-Root)





Summary of the Events

- two events
 - 2015-11-30t06:50 for 2h40m
 - 2015-12-01t05:10 for 1h
- affected 10 of 13 letters
- about 5M q/s or 3.5Gb/s per affected letter
 - aggregate: 34Gb/s (unreflected)
- real DNS queries, common query names, from spoofed source lps
- implications:
 - some letters had high loss
 - overall, though DNS worked fine
 - clients retried other letters (as designed)
 - but we want to do better

data: A-Root had full view (Verisign presentation); RSSAC-002 reports



How About the Letters?


some did great: D, L, M: not attacked A: no visible loss


most suffered: a bit (E, F, I, J, K) or a lot (B, C, G, H)

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
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























Site Flips from Routing Changes




black: failed query

300 Vantage Points (1/row)

[Moura16a, figure 11; data: RIPE Atlas]



Site Flips from Routing Changes




black: failed query

300 Vantage Points (1/row)

[Moura16a, figure 11; data: RIPE Atlas]



Site Flips from Routing Changes





Flips: Implications

- some ISPs are "sticky" and won't flip
 will suffer if their site is overloaded
- some ISPs will flip
 - but new site may not be much better
- result depends on many factors
 - actions taken by root operator
 - routing choices by operator and peer
 - and perhaps *peer's peers*, depending on congestion location
 - implementation choices
 - DNS, routing




During An Event: Active Routing Changes or Not?


- no active routing changes
 - should expect partial loss in future attacks
 - overloaded catchments will suffer during attack
 - need to pre-deploy excess capacity
 - operators understand and are doing these;
- active routing changes
 - important when aggregate attack and defense capacity is similar
 - requires much better measurement and route control
 - important to reduce client losses at smaller sites
 - seems necessary to get to 0% loss



Aside: Collateral Damage

- can an event hurt non-targets?
- yes! ...a risk of shared datacenters





D-FRA and D-SYD: less traffic (even though D was not directly attacked)



Recommendations


- current approach reasonable
 - build out capacity in advance
 - no active re-routing during attack
 - should expect some loss during each attack
- need true diversity to avoid collateral damage
- longer-term
 - need research to improve measurement and control
 - active control can improve loss during some attacks
- how many sites needed?
 - there is a *lot* of capacity already
 - many small sites seem to increase partial outages



More Info


 paper: <u>http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/</u> <u>PAPERS/Moura16b</u>

 data: <u>https://ant.isi.edu/datasets/</u> <u>anycast/</u>






Confirming Flips in BGP



flips common during events for most letters



flips seen in BGP

