#### Rolling with Confidence: Managing the Complexity of DNSSEC Operations

Moritz Müller<sup>1,2</sup>, Taejoong Chung<sup>3</sup>, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij<sup>2</sup>, Alan Mislove<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>SIDN, <sup>2</sup>University of Twente, <sup>3</sup>Northeastern University

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#### About SIDN

- Registry of the Dutch ccTLD .*nl*
- More than 5,8 million registered domains
- More than 3 million signed with DNSSEC
- SIDN Labs is its research department
- Goal: increase the security and stability of *.nl* and the Internet overall
- 7 team members + interns





# *"key rollovers are a fact of life when using DNSSEC"*



- ZSK Rollovers
- KSK Rollovers
- Algorithm Rollovers



initial	new RRSIGs	new DNSKEY	new DS	DNSKEY removal	RRSIGs removal
Parent:			> SOA 1		>
RRSIG par(SOA)			> RRSIG par(SOA)		>
DS_K_1 RRSIG_par(DS_K_1) -			> DS_K_2 > RRSIG_par(DS_K_2)		>
Child:					
SOA_0 RRSIG Z 10(SOA)	SOA_1 RRSIG Z 10(SOA)	SOA_2 RRSIG Z 10(SOA)		> SOA_3 > RRSIG Z 10(SOA)	S0A_4
KK51G_Z_10(SUA)	RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	$RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)$ $RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)$		> RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) > RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)
DNSKEY_K_1	DNSKEY_K_1	DNSKEY_K_1		>	
		DNSKEY_K_2			DNSKEY_K_2
DNSKEY_Z_10	DNSKEY_Z_10	DNSKEY_Z_10 DNSKEY Z 11			DNSKEY Z 11
<pre>RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)</pre>	RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)			
		RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)		> RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)	RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)



#### [Unbound-users] DNSSEC validation failure of .nl TLD

Marco Davids (SIDN) Wed Oct 31 12:29:20 CET 2012

----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1

Ηi,

On 10/29/12 20:14, Casey Deccio wrote:

> Looks like perhaps the new ZSK wasn't pre-published long enough.

As promised a brief (informal) follow-up on what happened.

Indeed the new ZSK wasn't pre-published long enough. After OpenDNSSEC generated it and just prior to publishing it in the DNS, the software encountered a problem. As a result of that, the zonefile was never published. In fact, we missed two zonefileupdates before we got all the right people mobilised and where ready to restart the process.

When we published the new zonefile, OpenDNSSEC figured that the pre-publication time was long enough and started to include new RRSIg's, made by the new ZSK. This resulted in validation errors.

So, the observation of Casey was just right.

We will maintain to look into this issue further and we will implement protective measures to prevent this from happening again.

Regards,

- --Marco



#### [Unbound-users] DNSSEC validation failure of .nl TLD

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Image: Construction of the new ZSK wash of the new NSK wash of the new ZSK wash of the new Z

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# *"this resulted in validation errors"*







8

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# *"this resulted in validation errors"*









## It's all about

the right timing







Forwarder























	<b>Publication Delay</b>	<b>Propagation Delay</b>
Description	Time it takes until every name server is in sync	Time it takes until resolvers have picked up the new state
Period	Seconds to minutes	Minutes, hours, or even days




initial	new RRSIGs	new DNSKEY	new DS	DNSKEY removal	RRSIGs removal
RRSIG_par(SOA) DS K 1			> RRSIG_par(SOA) > DS K 2		> > > >
Child: SOA_0 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_1 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	SOA_2 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)		-> RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_4 RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)
DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_10 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY) RRSIG K 2(DNSKEY)	 	-> DNSKEY_K_2 -> -> DNSKEY_Z_11	DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG K 2(DNSKEY)



5 Stages					
initial	new RRSIGs	new DNSKEY	new DS	DNSKEY removal	RRSIGs removal
Parent: SOA_0 RRSIG_par(SOA) DS_K_1 RRSIG_par(DS_K_1)			-> SOA_1 -> RRSIG_par(SOA) -> DS_K_2 -> RRSIG_par(DS_K_2) -		> > >
Child: SOA_0 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_1 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	SOA_2 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)		-> RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_4 RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)
DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_10 DNSKEY_Z_11 DNSKEY_Z_11		-> DNSKEY_K_2 -> -> DNSKEY_Z_11	DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_11
RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY) RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)		-> -> RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)	RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)





Algorith	m Rollov	er Stages	Interacti	on with parent	
5 Stages					
initial	new RRSIGs	new DNSKEY	new DS	DNSKEY removal	RRSIGs removal
RRSIG_par(SOA) DS_K_1			-> RRSIG_par(SOA) -> DS_K_2		>
Child: SOA_0 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_1 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	SOA_2 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)		> SOA_3 > RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) > RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	SOA_4 RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)
DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_10 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY) RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)		> > DNSKEY_K_2 > > DNSKEY_Z_11 > > RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)
		Wait	t for delays		
from RFC 6781, Fig 20	gure 8			Northoodtorn	VERSITY WENTE.

#### The Conservative Algorithm Rollover

- Some old Unbound resolvers expect one signature for each algorithm in the zone apex
- If not, they suspect a downgrade attack
- and fail validation :-(



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- Some old Unbound resolvers expect one signature for each algorithm in the zone apex
- If not, they suspect a downgrade attack
- and fail validation :-(

- We've tested this:
  - Out of 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes only 6 failed :-)



#### The .se Algorithm Rollover

- .se has 1.4 Million registered domains
- > 50% signed with DNSSEC
- ~ 70% of Swedish users rely on validating resolvers
- First algorithm rollover ever:
- From RSA/SHA-1 to RSA/SHA-256





#### 3 Measurement Types

- Monitor publication delay
- Monitor propagation delay
- Monitor the trust chain



initial	new RRSIGs	new DNSKEY	new DS	DNSKEY removal	RRSIGs removal
DS_K_1					
Child: SOA_0 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_1 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	SOA_2 RRSIG_Z_10(SOA) RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)	> > >	RRSIG_Z_10(SOA)	SOA_4 RRSIG_Z_11(SOA)
DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_Z_10 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_1 DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_10 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_1(DNSKEY) RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)	>	DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)	DNSKEY_K_2 DNSKEY_Z_11 RRSIG_K_2(DNSKEY)






#### **Publication Delay**

- Using 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes
- Query the authoritative NSes directly



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
#### **Propagation Delay**

- Using 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes
- Query for the new record using the probe's resolver



## **Propagation Delay**


- Using 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes
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## **Propagation Delay**

- Using 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes
- Query for the new record using the probe's resolver



### Timing of the Stage

- Publication delay:
- Propagation delay:
- Move to next stage after:

- $\sim$  10 minutes
- $\sim 48$  hours
- ~ 48 hours, 10 minutes




#### Monitor the Trust Chain

- Using 10.000 RIPE Atlas probes
- Luminati Network
- >46.000 VPs, > 8.000 behind validating resolvers
- Test-domains with valid and bogus records
- Which gives us three resolver states:
  - Validating, non-validating and bogus



#### Monitor the Trust Chain









- .se rollover was successful
- Conservative algorithm rollover not necessary
- Take your time



#### Monitor your own Rollover

- Measurements described at <u>sidnlabs.nl</u>
- Tool to automate the rollover available soon
- Detailed paper available soon (if it gets accepted)
- More information about the .se rollover:
  - <u>Preparation</u>
  - Lessons learned



#### Thanks

- to IIS, the operators of .se
- to RIPE



#### Thanks

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- to RIPE

Questions?

Moritz Müller

moritz.muller@sidn.nl

@moritzcm\_

