Domain names abuse and TLDs: from monetization towards mitigation

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Introduction

- DNS provides a simple label for hosts, services, applications on the Internet
- Often, it is misused in malicious activities such as:
  - phishing campaigns
  - malware
  - spam
- Underlying each type of abuse, a different business model
  - provides the incentives for the crooks to keep on

Introduction

- Plenty of research work in curbing DNS-related abuse [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
  - With a clear contribution
- But, they suffer from similar issues:
  1. Bound by dataset type/duration
  2. Cover specific attacks; missing broader view on all abuses
- **This paper:**
  1. Cover first issue with longitudinal measurements and registration (`.nl`)
  2. Present a survey on domain abuses from the point of view of a TLD operator (centralized view)

Motivation: why doing this?

Came from a situation we faced :

- **There's no one size fits all**
- we have all this data
- how to better use it?
- where to begin with?
    - e.g.: malicious registered phishing or compromised phishing?
    - or other sort of abuse?
    - how to prioritize it?
    - **Which datasets too look first?**
- Other TLD operators may be facing the same problem

Understanding business models

- Helps you to understand how money is made
- And how it impact your datasets
- It's been done many times in Internet abuse. E.g.: PharmaLeaks[7].
- Business model $\rightarrow$ abuse $\rightarrow$ money

TLD Operations and Datasets

Figure: TLD Operations: registration (left), domain name resolution (right), and derived datasets.

- `RegDB`: your registration DB
- `Zone File Scans`: in our case, the `OpenIntel.nl` project
- `AuthDNS`: data from auth servers, we use ENTRADA [8]

Business Models Survey and Lit Review

Business	Spam	RegDB	AuthDNS	Records	Lit
Phishing(0-day)	Yes	Weak	Strong	Weak	[3, 6]
Phishing(comp.)	Yes	None	Strong	Weak	[9]
Parking (Ads)	No	Strong	Weak	Strong	[10, 11]
Parking (Mal)	No	Strong	Weak	Strong	[10, 11]
Fake Goods	Yes	Weak	Weak	Medium	[6, 7]
Drop-Catch	No	Medium	Medium	Weak	[12]
Botnet C&C	No	Medium	Strong	?	[13]
Blackhat SEO	No	Medium	Medium	Strong	[14, 15]

Table: Business Models and Datasets/signal "strength", and research works that cover those.

Phising (0-day)

- Two types of phishing: compromised and 0-day (newly registered)
- 0-day phishing business model:
  1. Registered domain(s)
  2. Large spam campaign at the same time
  3. ID theft (ID, credit card, etc).
  4. Money: selling the data, using it themselves

Phising (0-day)

- Datasets:
  1. `Records`: harder to detect, IP/registrar reputation
  2. `RegDB`: hard but possible to detect (it's been done for spamming domains [16])
 3. `AuthDNS`: strongest signal, but after attack has started [3, 6]

Figure: .nl Random vs Phishing new domains average daily queries [6]

Phising (compromised)

- Most common sort of phishing
- Typically on hacked CMSes, instead of newly registered
- Business model:
  1. Hack a website
  2. Sam campaign at the same time
  3. ID theft (ID, credit card, etc).
  4. Money: selling the data, using it themselves

Phising (compromised)

- Datasets:
  1. `Records`: harder to detect, typically no changes
  2. `RegDB`: also, usually no changes in here
 3. `AuthDNS`: possible to detect, very hard to tell false positives source

Figure: Median daily queries for 1,374 compromised phishing sites on `.nl`, before and after Netcraft's notification

Parking

- Parking is a big industry
- Business model:
  1. Register many domains (bulk)
  2. Wait for traffic to come in
  3. Redirect to ad networks
  4. Money:
     - Legal: ad networks
     - Illegal: malicious, ID-theft

Parking

- Datasets:
    1. `Records`: can be done, same ASes, IPs, etc
    2. `RegDB`: Yes, bulk registrations, same registrar, etc.
   3. `AuthDNS`: usually not the case

Figure: Number of domains registered for one registrar, in every 30min – spikes indicates anomalies

Parking

- ▶ Datasets:
  1. `Records`: can be done, same ASes, IPs, etc
  2. `RegDB`: Yes, bulk registrations, same registrar, etc.
  3. `AuthDNS`: usually not the case

Figure: Anomalous registrations for Registrars and Top 1 registrant – most of registrations are done in bulk by 1 registrant.

Parking

- Key aspect: tell ad networks from malicious (e.g.: malicious redirection)
- Malicious redirection type has more incentives to use a new e-mail addresses during registrations (and no reuse)
- We've seen that for ad nets
- Need to develop a solution that address this (open)

Fake Goods

- When we develop nDEWS [8] to detect 0-day phishing, we notice a lot of domains were neither phishing neither false positives
- Their frequency and continuity suggested a profitable business model
- Just like phishing (0-day) business model, and detection too
- This sort of abuse falls into a "gray area":
  - not as bad as phishing
  - still bad because of ID theft
  - hard to tell if it's fake or not
- Detection: similar to 0-day phishing

Botnet C&C

- Domains can be used also for botnet command-and-control channels
- Domain generation algorithms (DGA) typically used for that
- Bots are supposed to contact a new domain every x time
- DGAs generated many, but only a few are registered , to avoid detection

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Botnet C&C

- Business model: registration
- Datasets:
  1. `RegDB`: registration of "weird" looking names
  2. `Records`: in combination with the previous
  3. `AuthDNS`: NXDOMAIN queries for non registered DGAs

Summary

- DNS abuse has been active for many years
- There are many types, which different business models
- Business models of DNS abuse impact datasets differently
- TLDs ops should develop applications according to business models
  - no one-size fits all
- Which one first?
  - that depends on the frequency of the abuse on their zone
- This paper presents a **survey** and a **discussion** on which datasets can be used
  - And some of our experience with these abuses on `.nl`

Questions?

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- Thank you for your attention

Download our paper at:

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/downloads/publications/
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